Introduction
Authors who adopt free indirect style (FIS) are sometimes said to reveal or show the thoughts or 'inner speech' of their characters (see Chatman, 1978; Ehrlich 1990 ) rather than tell the reader what those characters thought and did. The illusion that these characters are speaking is sustained by the use of so-called 'expressives' or 'subjectivity markers' (Banfield (1982; Fludernik 1993) which are associated with the communication or expression of thought or emotion -for example, the expressive words in (1a) (piffle and rot); the rhetorical question in (1a); the exclamative in (1b) and the reformulations and repetition in (1b): (the two excerpts are 25 lines apart and have been abridged slightly for purposes of presentation here):
(1) (a) What was the matter with the man? This mania for conversation irritated Stanley beyond words. And it was always the same always some piffle about a dream he'd had, or some cranky idea he'd got hold of, or some rot he'd been reading ….
(b) At that moment an immense wave lifted Jonathan … What a beauty! And now there came another. That was the way to live -carelessly, recklessly, spending oneself. He got to his feet and began to wade towards the shore, pressing his toes into the firm, wrinkled sand. To take things easy, not to fight against the ebb and flow of life, but to give way to it -that was what was needed…..To live -to live. (Mansfield, 'At the Bay', Collected Stories, 208) This characterisation has led to the question of how readers determine who is 'speaking' in fictional narratives (cf Genette 1980 Genette , 1988 , or, in other words, whose 'voice' we are 'hearing'. However, any claim that we 'hear' Stanley Burnell's voice in the first excerpt and Jonathan Trout's in the second cannot be understood literally -not just because this would be to confuse writing and speech (cf Aczel (1998) , but because neither character is speaking at all. This raises the first question addressed in this paper: how should we understand the notion of 'voice' as it is applied to the represented thoughts of fictional characters in narratives written in FIS?
In pragmatics, the term 'speaker' is often applied to anyone who is communicating using language, whether this is written or spoken. On this understanding, it might be thought that the term should be applied to whoever is attributed with the intention of revealing a character's thoughts -the author (or constructed author) or narrator. However, it has been argued (e.g by Aczel 1998 ) that the narrator of a free indirect text is simply a 'silent organizer' who has no 'voice'. This raises the second question addressed in this paper: how do we accommodate the notion of a silent organizer in an account of communication, or, in what sense, if any, can such a figure be regarded as communicating at all.
The background for the discussion of these questions is the debate about the roles of pretence and attribution in free indirect style. This debate parallels the debate about the roles these notions play in the account of verbal irony. Thus those authors who take irony as a kind of pretence in which the speaker simulates the performance of a speech act also argue that the same kind of pretence or simulation of behaviour is involved in FIS ( cf Currie 2006; Kumon-Nakamara, Glucksberg & Brown1995; Recanati 2000 Recanati , 2004 Recanati , 2007 Walton1990) . And within relevance theory it has been argued that free indirect discourse should be studied alongside irony as a variety of tacit attributive use which turns on the ability of speakers to use one conceptual representation to represent another by exploiting resemblances of content (Wilson 2006 , Sperber & Wilson 2011 . At the same time, however, Sperber & Wilson have argued that there are phenomena often referred to as 'irony' but which are better analysed in terms of imitation of public behaviour than in terms of the attribution of thought. This raises the question of whether the phenomena which constitute free indirect style might not also require a non-unitary explanation, and in particular, whether the voice effects achieved by so-called 'expressive' devices include both effects which are explained in terms of resemblances in content, and effects which are explained in terms of the simulation of behaviour. This paper argues that there are, indeed, two types of voice effects achieved by the use of expressives in FIS. On the one hand, as I have demonstrated in earlier work (Blakemore 2008) , repetitions and pseudo-repetitions (e.g. carelessly, recklessly, spending oneself in (1b)) provide a means of leading the audience to a concept which cannot be expressed by any one of these words but which provides a more faithful representation of the a character's thoughts. At the same time, as I have shown in (Blakemore 2010 (Blakemore , 2011 , the relevance theoretic notion of procedural meaning (Blakemore 1987 (Blakemore , 2002 can be extended to interjections (e.g. oh), expletive adjective phrases and epithets (e.g. bloody, the bastard) so that they encode procedures for activating representations of a person's thoughts, thought processes and emotions (see also Wharton 2003a,b; 2009) . On this account, the difference between the use of these devices in ordinary communication and their use in FIS is that whereas in the former they play a role in enabling the audience to construct representations of the communicator's thoughts and emotions, in the latter they enable the reader to construct representations of a non-communicating (fictional) third person's thoughts and emotions. In this way, they provide a particularly effective means of creating the illusion 'of a character acting out his mental state in an immediate relationship with the reader (Dillon & Kirchhoff (1976: 438) .
On the other hand, Sperber & Wilson's account of metarepresentation also allows us to account for voice effects overlooked in Blakemore (2010 Blakemore ( , 2011 , including those cases which have been described by Fludernik (1993) and Currie (2010) in terms of the (often exaggerated) 'borrowing' or 'imitation' of a character's style for the purpose of caricature. As Wilson (2006) and Sperber & Wilson (2011) have shown, caricature or parody can be accommodated in their general account of representation by resemblance since this draws not only on the exploitation of resemblances between the contents of thoughts but also on the exploitation of resemblances in behaviour. However, we shall see that an author can exploit resemblances between the properties of utterances (or public behaviour) not only as a means of eliciting an attitude of ridicule, but also, as a means of evoking a sense of empathy.
The picture of free indirect style that emerges has implications for the role of the narrator of FIS style texts which seem to be inconsistent with the relevance theoretic analysis of FIS in terms of tacit attributive use (above). According to Sperber & Wilson's account, FIS utterances are representations of the speaker's thoughts about another person's (character's) thoughts (my emphasis). In the final section, I build on arguments suggested by my earlier work (Blakemore 2010) and develop a more fully worked out case for the proposal that although there are passages of FIS in which the use of expressives can be taken as evidence of the thoughts of the person responsible for the narrative, there are texts in which this is the exception rather than the rule, and expressives are associated with the perspective of a fictional third person. This suggests that such texts must be distinguished from other cases of attributive representation, for example, irony. At the same time, I shall argue that the idea that FIS is the product of silent organization (cf Aczel 1998) is compatible with a relevance theoretic account of communication, not only because it turns on the reader's ability to identify both resemblances in content between thoughts and resemblances between formal properties of utterances, but because the 'silent organizer', like any communicator, is constrained by the aim of achieving optimal relevance. The point is that whereas in normal communication relevance is achieved by increasing the sense of mutuality between speaker and hearer, in free indirect discourse it is achieved by in the relationship that the communicator/writer creates between the reader and the characters whose thoughts are represented.
2. Background: free indirect style, pretence and attributive use 2.1 Irony and free indirect style as the simulation of behaviour According to Recanati (2007: 224) the speaker of an ironic utterance such as (2) or a free indirect thought report such as (3) 'says something without actually asserting what she says or 'makes as if to say' (Grice [1989] )'.
(2) [Henry is watching the speaker struggle with a large pile of books] You're so helpful, Henry (3) Henry paused before he knocked on the door. He would be assertive. He would listen to what she had to say, but he would not let her walk all over him. Recanati (2007:226) argues that in both irony and free indirect discourse, we must distinguish the context of utterance (or locutionary context) from the context of assertion (illocutionary context), since in this sort of communication the two contexts do not coincide and the speaker who performs the locutionary act will not be said to have performed the illocutionary act. Thus in (2) and (3) the speaker is 'endorsing the function of speaker and saying that p, while (i) not taking responsibility for what is being said, and (ii) implicitly ascribing that responsibility to someone else, namely, the person whose act of assertion is being mimicked'. In this way, says Recanati, 'the illocutionary act is not being performed but is merely being displayed, represented ' (2007:227) .
In the case of (2) we might say that the speaker of (2) is simulating a public utterance which someone might have made. However, as Wilson (2000 Wilson ( , 2006 and Sperber & Wilson (2011) have pointed out, it is not clear how this sort of account would accommodate those cases of irony in which the speaker is targeting a thought which has not been overtly expressed. Nor is it clear how the notion of assertion applies to private thoughts such as Jonathan Trout's thoughts in (1b) above, or Linda Burnell's thoughts as she sits with her baby son: (4) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her children.
[…] Even if she had the strength she would never have nursed and played with the little girls. No, it was a though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy -well, thank heaven, mother had taken him. (Mansfield, 'At the Bay', Collected Stories, 223) Recanati's response to this is to say that since in all cases the act on display is an expression of attitude, the notion of assertion could be broadened so that it includes private acts of thought. However, while it may make sense to mimic a public speech act, it is not clear what it would mean to mimic a private thought.
It might seem that instead of broadening the notion of assertion or speech so that encompasses thought, it would be preferable to focus on the way in which speakers use public representations (utterances) as evidence of their thoughts. Then one could say that a speaker who speaks ironically or produces an utterance in FIS is imitating or simulating an utterance that could be taken as evidence of a thought or epistemological position. In other words, the speaker is producing a representation of an utterance that someone would have made, had s/he voiced or expressed their thoughts. If this is right, then it seems we must say that in (4) Mansfield has provided a representation not of Linda thinking but of Linda formatting her thoughts for speaking.
This would seem to be the implication of Walton's (1990) version of the pretence theoretic approach to irony and free indirect discourse. Walton characterizes a speaker who is speaking ironically as 'fictionally asserting what they would assert ' (1990:222) , and a narrator who produces a free indirect representation of a character's thoughts as fictionally pretending to be in the epistemological position of that character:
'Fictionally, the narrator speaks as though he himself were, in many respects, in the epistemological position he attributes to the character, reporting what he takes the character to know and remaining silent about what he takes the character not to know. In some cases we might understand it to be fictional that the narrator pretends to be in that epistemological position, as a way of indicating that the character is, the pretense consisting in participation in a game of make believe.' (Walton: 1990: 379) However, notice that in imagining a character voicing her thoughts, an author is not necessarily imagining a character communicating her thoughts to an audience. When we read Mansfield's representation of Linda thinking about the way she feels about having children, it is more like overhearing someone speaking to herself than hearing evidence of someone's communicative intentions. Indeed, it seems that in contrast with direct thought reports, which are used to represent a highly verbalized flow of conscious thought, free indirect thought representations contain a range of devices -hesitation, self-interruption, sudden changes in direction, incomplete sentences, reformulations which give the impression of a character struggling to identify his /her emotions -which encourage the reader to interpret them as representations of unconscious thought. Thus Currie (2010) describes such representations as expressions of a point of view and argues that while people may use behaviour in order to express themselves overtly, 'we are most inclined to think of behaviour as genuinely expressive of a point of view when it seems not to have been intended as so expressive ' (2010:91) . While Currie's (2010) approach to irony is similar to that of Walton, he argues for a different sort of mechanism for free indirect style. Thus while he describes the ironist's pretence as being 'at bottom, a matter of pretending to have a certain outlook, perspective, or point of view ' (2010:156) , he argues that in free indirect style the narrator does not take on or come to occupy a defective point of view (2010: 130) . Instead, the mechanism that is involved requires 'a general sense of imitation which includes, for example, my uttering a sentence which you have never uttered, but saying it in a way which brings to mind your characteristic mode of utterance. By imitating some aspects of a person's way of behavingtheir 'style' as we say -I may manage to do something which is expressive of their point of view ' (2010:130) . Thus for example, Currie suggests that by imitating Strether's style of speech in The Ambassadors, James is able to communicate the frame of mind, or the disposition to approach the world which we suppose Strether to have (2010:132; for further analysis of Strether's language, see Watt 1960) . The question raised by this account is what it means to say that certain behaviour is expressive of a point of view. More generally, it seems that in all these accounts, it is assumed that the speaker imitates an utterance (or public behaviour) which another person might have made and at the same time attributes an epistemological position or point of view to the person whose utterance is being imitated. This suggests that we need two mechanisms in an account of free indirect style: first, the sort of mechanism described by Recanati which enables speakers to perform a speech act without being committed to its illocutionary force; and, second, a mechanism which explains how this attribution is achieved.
Attribution and resemblances in content
Within relevance theory Wilson (2006) and Sperber & Wilson (2011) have proposed that their notion of attributive use allows us to by-pass the first mechanism in accounts of both irony and free indirect style. According to this approach, an audience who takes an utterance as evidence of a point of view does so because they understand it to communicate thoughts which are like the thoughts that someone with that point of view would have. As we shall see, the notion of resemblance that underlies this account is resemblance of content rather than resemblance of form. However, this notion of resemblance is part of a general account of meta-representation developed by Sperber & Wilson (1995 within the framework of their relevance theoretic approach to pragmatics.
In this account, any sort of representation can be used to meta-represent another representation which it resembles. As Sperber & Wilson emphasize, resemblance does not mean reproduction or duplication. Thus even direct representations, which are often assumed to be identical to the utterances they represent, do not necessarily reproduce the original exactly. The utterance in (5) was heard in a reading of a story for children (BBC (2000) underlined, translation and interpreting practice reveals many examples of cases in which the translation includes items which affect the hearer's interpretation but which do not correspond to items in the original. For example, in (6) the interpreter's addition of a discourse initial well would be considered to be appropriate even though the original contained no word that corresponded to it (example due to Berk-Seligson (1988:32) . Interpreter: Well, it's a small house.
Quotations and translations only resemble the original to some degree. Sperber & Wilson (1995) and Wilson (2000) propose that resemblances between representations depends on the extent to which they share different sorts of properties. Thus while direct quotations exploit resemblances in formal linguistic properties, indirect quotations exploit resemblances at the level of semantic or implicated content. Thus both (8) and (9) could be uttered as indirect representations of the utterance in (7) on the grounds that they share logical and contextual implications: (7) I'm afraid I can't see you today after all.
(8) She said that she can't see us today.
(9) She said that she is too busy to see us today.
Sperber & Wilson call the resemblances at the level of semantic and implicated content
interpretive. Thus one representation is an interpretive representation of another to the extent that they share logical and contextual implications. The more logical and contextual implications they share, the greater the resemblance. However, the degree of resemblance that is expected will vary from context to context and will be determined by the assumption that the speaker has aimed at optimal relevance. Thus the search for optimal relevance may lead a speaker aiming to produce a summary of a book chapter or lecture to produce a meta-representation which shares only some of the logical and contextual assumptions of the original. Sperber & Wilson (1995) and Wilson (2000) claim that in any act of communication an utterance is used as an interpretation of a thought of the speaker. However, if this thought is about another thought, as in indirect speech and thought reports, the thought interpreted by this utterance is itself an interpretation of an attributed thought which it resembles in content.
This might be a thought communicated by a particular person in the immediate or distant past; it might be a thought attributed to a particular person on the basis of some other kind of (non-verbal) behaviour; it might be a thought attributed to certain types of people or even to people in general.
In some cases, they argue, the relevance of attributed use which achieve relevance by communicating the speaker's attitude or reaction to the thought represented, or in In some cases, however, the point of producing an utterance which is an interpretation of a thought which is about an attributed thought simply lies in the information provided about the content of the attributed thought. Indirect thought and speech reports achieve relevance in this way; however, according to Sperber and Wilson, so (11) (a) An announcement came over the loudspeaker. All the trains were delayed.
(b) The passengers were angry. When would they ever get home?
(12) (a) Would the trains ever run on time, the passengers were wondering.
As Sperber & Wilson point out, such examples have properties which are said to characterize free indirect discourse (lack of subordination, shifted tense and reference).
However, since the interpretive use of utterances is based on a resemblance in content, there is no need to say that a speaker who is representing another person's thoughts in an indirect thought report is 'fictionally asserting [or pretending to assert] what someone else would assert (cf Walton 1990:222 above). Nor do we need to think of a speaker who communicates an ironic attitude towards private thoughts, wishes or fantasies as pretending to produce an utterance which is the one which someone with who had those private thoughts/wishes/fantasies would have made (cf Currie 2010). As Sperber & Wilson (2011) ask 'wouldn't it be more parsimonious to bypass the pretence element entirely and go directly to the echoic account ' (2011:xx Banfield (1982) and Fludernik (1993) include formal properties of utterances which are at the borderline of linguistics (e.g. Linda
Burnell's ah in (13) it was a though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy -well, thank heaven, mother had taken him. (Mansfield, ' At the Bay', Collected Stories, 223).
(1) (a) What was the matter with the man? This mania for conversation irritated Stanley beyond words. And it was always the same always some piffle about a dream he'd had, or some cranky idea he'd got hold of, or some rot he'd been reading
Given this heterogeneity, one might wonder whether there can be a unitary account of expressive meaning in free indirect style. Perhaps, not surprisingly, no attempt has been made to provide such an account within linguistics or within literary stylistics (for further discussion, see Blakemore 2011). However, it seems that whether these expressive devices are properly linguistic, non-linguistic or at the borderline of linguistics, they have a property which might suggest that they cannot be accommodated in an account of free indirect style which turns on resemblances of content: it is extremely difficult to pin down the contributions they make in propositional or conceptual terms. Thus within relevance theory it has been argued that the meanings of words such as well, thank heaven, ah and no do not correspond to concepts (cf Blakemore 1987 Blakemore , 2002 Wharton 2003a,b; 2009) , and that there are words with an expressive dimension of meaning which cannot be analysed in propositional terms, for example, the bastard, bloody, the poppet (cf Blakemore & Wharton (in preparation) ). And as Sperber & Wilson (1995) have emphasized, devices such as repetition give rise to effects that cannot be pinned down in propositional terms. The question, then, is whether the effects of these devices can indeed be explained in the attributive account outlined above, which turns on resemblances in content, or whether they are more appropriately analysed in terms of the imitation of behaviour (cf Currie 2010).
In the following section I shall summarize work within relevance theory which shows that way in which these devices contribute to the interpretation of the utterances that contain them is not incompatible with an analysis in which they play a role in the representation of characters' thoughts and emotions. 5 However, in 3.3, I shall go on to show that expressives are not always used by authors for the purpose of providing faithful representations of their characters thoughts and emotions, but are also used as a means of simulating their character's behaviour in a way which is analogous to the simulation of behaviour in parody (cf Wilson 2006 , Sperber & Wilson 2011 The problem here is that the concept communicated by curse is not one that is encoded by its linguistically encoded meaning, but is derived inferentially from the encyclopedic assumptions it triggers together with other contextual assumptions made accessible by the rest of the utterance (see Carston 2002 Carston , 2010 Wilson & Carston 2008) . The problem in (14) is that cursed does not seem to communicate a concept at all, and in this sense it is more like the one presented by non-linguistic phenomena such as gestures, facial expressions and so-called 'tone of voice'. Thus while it seems clear that a speaker who produces the utterance in (17) According to this analysis, the reader need not assume that ah or well are constituents of utterances that Linda would have made. Their use can simply be understood as a means of encouraging the reader to derive a representation of Linda's emotions, thoughts and thought processes. In the case of well we can say that the hearer is encouraged to access whatever contextual assumptions they believe would justify its use -assumptions which are then attributed to Linda even though they are not actually represented explicitly by Mansfield. As I have argued elsewhere (Blakemore 2010) , these are assumptions which would derive from the need to demonstrate that the baby's presence does not detract from Linda's claims to any lack of maternal feeling, or more generally, from the assumption that the answer to the question 'what about the baby?' is relevant. However, the main point here is that since the reader is given the responsibility for accessing these assumptions, he is left with the impression that he has accessed assumptions which are similar to those accessed by Linda, and thus contributes to the illusion that he is participating in her thought processes.
Similarly, one does not need to assume that the narrator in (14) Is it really appropriate to describe expressions which perform this sort of function as part of a character's voice? As we have seen, expressives can perform the sort of function just described without any sort of assumption that they are characteristic of the utterances that a character might make should she voice her thoughts. Thus we need not assume that they are representative of the character's 'style' (cf Currie 2010, 130-1) . This would suggest that while the term 'voice effect' captures the fact that authors use devices associated with communication for the representation of private thoughts, there is a sense in which it does not capture the function described in this section.
Expressives and the imitation of style
As Wilson (2006) and Sperber & Wilson (2011) have pointed out, the term 'irony' has been applied to a very wide range of phenomena not all of which can be treated in terms of attributive use of conceptual representations. In particular, they suggest parody is achieved by the imitation of behaviour, or of the stylistic properties of the formal properties of utterances which the speaker believes someone might have made. This phenomenon has been described in terms of the imitation or borrowing of another person's voice (cf Fludernik 1993:333) , thus suggesting that this is a written version of the phenomenon described by Clark & Gerrig (1984) :
'In pretense or make believe, people generally leave their own voices behind for new
ones. An actor playing Othello assumes a voice appropriate to Othello. An ironist pretending to be S' might assume a voice appropriate to S'. To convey an attitude about S', however, the ironist will generally exaggerate or caricature S's voice' (Clark & Gerrig 1984:122) .
However, as Sperber & Wilson (2011) Day' is in the name: although he professes that he cannot stand vain men, and that the thrill of satisfaction' he feels when he sees himself in the mirror in the morning after dressing is, according to him, 'purely artistic' (Mansfield, Mr Reginald Peacock's Day, Collected Stories, 146) , the reader knows from the very first paragraph that this is preposterous:
If there was one thing that he hated more than another it was the way she had of waking him up in the morning. She did it on purpose, of course. It was her way of establishing her grievance for the day, and he was not going to let her know how successful it was. In contrast with the expressive language in the representations of Linda Burnell's thoughts discussed in the previous section, this expressive language is used to simulate Mr Peacock's behaviour rather than to encourage the reader to partake in an exploration of his emotional life. The repetition is used as a means of encouraging us to imagine the sort of person who would react to the process of being woken up in this way rather than a means of sharing Mr Peacock's inner life, and the result is that we adopt an attitude of derision towards this sort of behaviour.
Indeed, it is not really clear that Mr Peacock has an inner life: he turns out to be all style and no substance. Thus we soon find out that he requires his rather baffled son to shake hands with him every morning; he delights in his own wit and elegance, performing even the simplest task as if he were on stage; and his claim that he cannot stand vain men follows a detailed representation of his exercise regime and toilette (including his concerns about getting fat), and is followed by the description of how flattered he is by a letter from one of his pupils. Thus it is not surprising that even when he experiences something approaching a genuine emotion at the end of the story and attempts to explain how he feels to his wife, he can only produce the formulaic repetition, "Dear lady, I should be so charmed -so charmed" (Mansfield, Collected Stories, 153) .
It seems that the case for describing the phenomena discussed in this section in terms of the imitation of voice is stronger than the case for using the term 'voice' to describe the effects discussed in the preceding section. The mechanism involved in the examples discussed here mirrors the one Sperber & Wilson (2011) suggest is involved in parody.
However, as we have seen, the point of imitating a character's style is not always to encourage the reader to adopt dissociative attitudes towards this character: in some cases the reader's interpretation will be based a cognitive environment which is assumed to be shared with a character or characters, or in other words, a sense of empathy.
4. The role of the narrator in free Indirect thought representations
Authors, implied authors and narrators
According to Currie (2010:130) , if I wish my imitation of your gait, dress, or verbal style to contain elements of caricature, I must exaggerate aspects of them while managing to present them as recognizably your own. This would suggest that the ability to recognize an imitation as a caricature depends simply on the comparison of actual behaviour (gait, dress or verbal style) as it is imagined by the reader and the exaggerated version provided by the author. However, the discussion of Mansfield's portraits of Alice in 'At the Bay' and Mr Peacock suggests that the reader's recognition that he is intended to find a character ridiculous is rather more complex than this. Thus the reader of (23) it was a though a cold breath had chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys; she had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy -well, thank heaven, mother had taken him. (Mansfield, 'At the Bay', Collected Stories, 223) In other words, the voice effects discussed in both 3.2 and 3.3 are the result not only of the use of expressive devices, but also of the fact that they are interpreted in the context of other parts of the fiction.
The discussion so far would suggest that we must attribute the responsibility for selecting expressives and organizing the text in such a way that the appropriate contexts are available to us to Mansfield herself. However, as a number of theorists have pointed out, this view cannot be maintained: there are a number of reasons for saying that this responsibility cannot be attributed with the actual author (see Booth 1983 , Cohn 1999 , Aczel 1998 , Currie 2010 McHale (1983) assumes that this constructed author figure must be 'functionally distinct' from the narrator, arguing that he had been incorrect (in a previous article) to speak of the narrator as 'the organizer and guarantor of meaningfulness' because the 'the narrator narrates' while 'the author organizes and guarantees meaningfulness'. If this view is correct, then it seems that we may be justified in banishing the narrator from free indirect discourse leaving the role of organization and selection to the constructed or implied author. However, Aczel's (1998) argues that organization and selection are integral to the act of narrating, and that a narrator's function cannot be reduced to that of 'stenographer' (cf Chatman 1978) or transcriber of a taped discourse (cf (Jahn 1983) : 'If all "the sentences of a narrative" are in some sense selected sentences, it becomes very difficult to conceive of a narrated discourse without a "selector"; and if narration, as a process, is itself impossible without selection, there seems to be little reason for banishing the narrator from third person narratives' (Aczel1998: 492).
It seems that Currie (2010: 65 -69 ) takes a similar view. There is, he argues, no distinction between narrative making and narrative telling. A narrative is made by someone with a particular communicative intention -an intention which cannot be attributed to However, the question is whether there is anything in the story which can be taken as evidence of a persona who is actively helping the reader to recognize that this is his intention. Moreover, it has to be asked whether in producing evidence of his imaginings about a character, the (constructed) author is producing evidence of a persona who can be attributed with feelings and attitudes towards that character, or, in other words, whether they are producing evidence for a point of view which is distinct from that of the character(s) whose thoughts are being represented.
This is clearly the case in examples of irony in which the echoed thoughts are embedded in the context of a text with an explicit first person narrator, or in the context of a text in which the narrator addresses the reader. Consider, for example, the non-literary example in (25) where the point of view represented by the italicized question is understood to contrast with that of the first person narrator: In other words, in these stories, Mansfield/the narrator is showing us a character's thoughts, thought processes, emotions and, in the case of Mr Peacock, style. And in doing so she is engaged in an act of intentional, ostensive communication. We can accommodate this in the relevance theoretic model of communication outlined above, if we decouple the responsibility for ensuring that the effort of processing the text will be rewarded by optimal relevance from the point of view that is being represented. Thus while the narrator is responsible for orchestrating our interpretation of free indirect thought representations, for selecting and organizing material in such a way that the effort of processing will result in optimal relevance, we do not necessarily assume that this function is being performed by someone who intends to communicate their own thoughts: the relevance of the act of narration may instead lie in the sense of mutuality that is achieved between reader and character.
Conclusion
This suggests that our understanding of these stories depends on the recognition that the author's intention is to achieve what is impossible in the real world: to show another person's feelings or thoughts in exactly the same way that they might show their own -through the ostensive use of natural behaviours, linguistic behaviours, borderline linguistic behaviours and the use of words which in other situations might be used for the cathartic, private expression of emotion.
This paper has argued that this intention is not always fulfilled in the same way. On the one hand, there are cases in which the use of expressive devices leads to the formation of thoughts which are understood to resemble other (attributed) thoughts. In other words, there are cases which suggest that the explanation of the way in which this intention is fulfilled turns on the ability to exploit resemblances between thought contents. On the other hand, I have argued that there are other cases in which the explanation of the role of expressives in showing the point of view of another turns on the ability to exploit resemblances between public utterances or styles. While some of these case fall within the class of phenomena classified by Sperber & Wilson (2011) as parody, we have seen that the purpose of imitating a style may be to evoke memories or assumptions which contribute to a sense of empathy with a character rather than a sense of dissociation. 2. In this paper I take style to be a property of the public utterances or behaviour which is taken as evidence for people's thoughts rather than a way of thinking (e.g. kinds of beliefs that people might hold or the sort of approach that they might apply to a particular problem. Within the relevance theoretic framework of this paper, style refers particularly to those choices speakers make in formulating their utterances which reflect (and, indeed, sometimes communicate) their assumptions about the contextual resources and processing abilities of their audience (see Sperber & Wilson 1995:217-224 for further discussion.
3. I am grateful to Fabrizio Gallai for this example.
4. For further discussion, see Sperber & Wilson 1995; Blakemore 2008. 5 . In this section (3.2) I will focus on expressive devices which have been analyzed in terms of coded procedures for the recovery of representations of thoughts and emotions. For a discussion of how repetition and pseudo repetition (e.g. carelessly,
recklessly, spending oneself in (1b) can be treated as contributing to the interpretation of thoughts, see Blakemore 2008. 6. I am grateful to a Mind and Language reviewer for drawing attention to this point.
7. It would be interesting to consider here whether we should also preclude translators and interpreters from this role. On the one hand, it could be argued that their role is simply to facilitate, and that the resulting translation is not expressive of their intentions; on the other, it could be argued that a translation is essentially an interpretation of the original (where this is understood in the sense defined by Sperber & Wilson 1995) , and that our understanding of the translation is therefore in some sense dependent on the knowledge, values and outlook of the translator.
8. As Currie points out, this is not to say that the narratives in stories -for example, Thackeray's fictional narrator, Barry Lyndon or Dr Watson in the Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories may not be unreliable.
